This book is devoted to systematic and thorough comments on China’s antitrust laws,regulations,and common practices as well as the enforcement conducted by both administrative regulators and judicial courts since Antimonopoly Law entered into effect in 2008 and then make recommendations on solving those identified issues. Totally there are 24 case comments in this book,including analysis to 6 judgments decided by the courts,8 non-merger decisions and 10 merger decisions made by China’s antitrust regulators. First part of Chapter 1 explores the legislative intent of Antimonopoly Law (AML). The author argues consumer protection shall be AML’s primary legislative intent and “to maintain a uniform and open market” should also be added as a secondary intent. Meanwhile,protection of public interest shall NOT be listed as a goal to be achieved by AML since it is too vague and too easily being distorted by the interest group. The second part of this Chapter elaborates the exceptions to the general application of antitrust law,concludes several development trends of these exceptions and then provide author’s policy recommendations. Chapter 2 deals with monopoly agreement. When elaborating cartel’s essential elements and its anticompetitive effects,the author explains why he is in disagreement with the judge in an influential ruling. In determining what constitute an illegal Resale Price Maintenance (RPM),China’s courts conspicuously differ with the antitrust regulator. The author makes a thorough assessment to the pro-competitive and anticompetitive effect of RPM before reaching his conclusion and coming up with his policy recommendations. The author then proposes depression cartel and export cartel shall NOT be exempted by AML with an aim to prevent market distortion. Chapter 3 elaborates both the determinative elements and justifications of AML’s abusing dominance conducts,including overpricing,refusal to deal,exclusive contracts,tying,and discriminative treatment. After reviewing EU’s unsuccessful enforcement and arguing the inherent logic error of its concept,the author suggests collective dominance is of little value. Chapter 4 and 5 respectively deal with certain substantive and procedural issues of merger review. All elements to be taken into consideration in merger review are categorized as ones either confirming or rebutting anticompetitive effects. Case comments are provided to illustrate unilateral effect and coordinative effect. By setting a high bar for identifying the anticompetitive effects of a non-horizontal merger,the author argues the regulator shall be more cautious in handling non-horizontal mergers. Joint venture (JV) is a special issue dealing both with merger review and cartel investigation. The author identifies certain insufficiencies and deficiencies in China’s antitrust enforcement of JV and offers his proposals. A couple of case comments are given in this chapter to explore the ways to improve effectiveness of a remedy imposed upon merger parties. Chapter 5 mainly deals with four procedural issues,including pre-notification consultation,conditional approval process,filing withdrawal,and investigation in a merger review. Some drawbacks are identified in each of these four issues and the improvement suggestions are given accordingly. Chapter 6 focuses on investigation against alleged anticompetitive conduct,mainly dealing with the rights and obligations for regulator and interested parties and briefly talking about the commitment proposed by the investigated party to end an investigation.

The author,used to be a lawyer,antitrust enforcer and currently an in-house antitrust counsel,tries to make comments on China’s antitrust legislation and enforcement based on his own experience and understanding,with an aim to make a contribution to on-going enforcement improvement and upcoming AML revamp.