Abstract

This book analyzes the production and operations management of the online retailer in the presence of customer return，from the perspective of channel choice and consumer returns behavior. Several game model of the online retailer or online retail supply chain are established，respectively. On this basis，we analyze the impact of the consumer returns on the online retailer’s operational decision and the coopetition relationship between cooperate partners. Through the studies of operations management strategies of online retailers，the models，theoretical methods and operational strategies supplies the theoretical basis and decision reference for the online retailers’ operation management practice.

Firstly，we consider the product can meet or not expectations before receiving it cannot be certain and the consumer returns behavior. According to the consumer rational expectation hypothesis and utility theory，we established the consumer expected utility function and product demand function，respectively. Then，several types of two-stage dynamic game model in this section are established. We analyzed the impacts of the consumer returns on the online retailer’s pricing，promotion strategies and money-back guarantee. The results show that，when the online retailer’s loss of the product returns satisfy several conditions，the consumer returns can increase the retail price. More-over，online retailer offers a money-back guarantee，which allows customers to return products that do not meet their expectations to the retailer for a full refund. The money-back guarantees strategy online retailers provide can effectively increase the price when the return cost of consumers is relatively low，and its can always decrease demand and increase consumer surplus，but not necessarily increase the online re-tailer’s profit.

Secondly，this section analyzes the optimal pricing policies，O2O channel strategies and contracts design within an O2O supply chain that consists of an online retailer and a manufacturer. Two benchmark models in single-channel and in O2O channel scenarios are established，respectively. With the solutions，we derive the optimal profit of O2O supply chain and the equilibrium pricing，demands，profits under each channel structure for each supply chain participant. On this basis，we analyze the effects of O2O channel strategy on the equilibriums and consumer returns behavior. The results show that，the introduction of the O2O channel can increase the products demand and decrease product return rates. But it may not increase the performance of O2O supply chain. Moreover，the introduction of the O2O channel can increase the manufacturer’s profit and consumer surplus，and the product return rate and the retailer’s leadership motivates the online retailer to encroach.

Finally，we consider the case in which both the experience service level and the experience service cost are considered as the showroom’s private information，and incentive mechanisms are designed under both the adverse selection and moral hazard. Moreover，we analyzed the impacts of the experience service on the consumer behavior，online retailer’s optimal pricing and online referral strategy. The results show that，the online retailer could optimize the incentive contracts under asymmetric information by balancing the trade-off between the loss of the supply chain’s profit and the information rent. The existence of asymmetric information can decrease the expected profits of the online retailer and the O2O supply chain. For this，when the showroom’s bargaining power satisfies several conditions，the showroom will reveal the private information voluntarily and share the supply chain’s profit with the retailer.

Keywords：Online Retailer；Consumer Returns；Money-Back Guarantee；O2O Mode