THE IDEAS, REASONING POWER, AND IMAGINATIONOF CROWDS 群體的觀念、推理與想象力

1. The ideas of crowds. Fundamental and accessory ideas — How contradictory ideas may exist simultaneously — The transformation that must be undergone by lofty ideas before they are accessible to crowds — The social influence of ideas is independent of the degree of truth they may contain.

2. The reasoning power of crowds. Crowds are not to be influenced by reasoning— The reasoning of crowds is always of a very inferior order — There is only the appearance of analogy or succession in the ideas they associate.

3. The imagination of crowds. Strength of the imagination of crowds — Crowds think in images, and these images succeed each other without any connecting link —Crowds are especially impressed by the marvellous — Legends and the marvellous are the real pillars of civilisation — The popular imagination has always been the basis of the power of statesmen — The manner in which facts capable of striking the imagination of crowds present themselves for observation.

1. THE IDEAS OF CROWDS

WHEN studying in a preceding work the part played by ideas in the evolution of nations, we showed that every civilisation is the outcome of a small number of fundamental ideas that are very rarely renewed. We showed how these ideas are implanted in the minds of crowds, with what difficulty the process is effected, and the power possessed by the ideas in question when once it has been accomplished. Finally we saw that great historical perturbations are the result, as a rule, of changes in these fundamental ideas.

Having treated this subject at sufficient length, I shall not return to it now, but shall confine myself to saying a few words on the subject of such ideas as are accessible to crowds, and of the forms under which they conceive them.

They may be divided into two classes. In one we shall place accidental and passing ideas created by the influences of the moment: infatuation for an individual or a doctrine, for instance. In the other will be classed the fundamental ideas, to which the environment, the laws of heredity and public opinion give a very great stability; such ideas are the religious beliefs of the past and the social and democratic ideas of to-day.

These fundamental ideas resemble the volume of the water of a stream slowly pursuing its course; the transitory ideas are like the small waves, for ever changing, which agitate its surface, and are more visible than the progress of the stream itself although without real importance.

At the present day the great fundamental ideas which were the mainstay of our fathers are tottering more and more. They have lost all solidity, and at the same time the institutions resting upon them are severely shaken. Every day there are formed a great many of those transitory minor ideas of which I have just been speaking; but very few of them to all appearance seem endowed with vitality and destined to acquire a preponderating influence.

Whatever be the ideas suggested to crowds they can only exercise effective influence on condition that they assume a very absolute, uncompromising, and simple shape. They present themselves then in the guise of images, and are only accessible to the masses under this form. These imagelike ideas are not connected by any logical bond of analogy or succession, and may take each other's place like the slides of a magic-lantern which the operator withdraws from the groove in which they were placed one above the other. This explains how it is that the most contradictory ideas may be seen to be simultaneously current in crowds. According to the chances of the moment, a crowd will come under the influence of one of the various ideas stored up in its understanding, and is capable, in consequence, of committing the most dissimilar acts. Its complete lack of the critical spirit does not allow of its perceiving these contradictions.

This phenomenon is not peculiar to crowds. It is to be observed in many isolated individuals, not only among primitive beings, but in the case of all those — the fervent sectaries of a religious faith, for instance — who by one side or another of their intelligence are akin to primitive beings. I have observed its presence to a curious extent in the case of educated Hindoos brought up at our European universities and having taken their degree. A number of Western ideas had been superposed on their unchangeable and fundamental hereditary or social ideas. According to the chances of the moment, the one or the other set of ideas showed themselves each with their special accompaniment of acts or utterances, the same individual presenting in this way the most flagrant contradictions. These contradictions are more apparent than real, for it is only hereditary ideas that have sufficient influence over the isolated individual to become motives of conduct. It is only when, as the result of the intermingling of different races, a man is placed between different hereditary tendencies that his acts from one moment to another may be really entirely contradictory. It would be useless to insist here on these phenomena, although their psychological importance is capital. I am of opinion that at least ten years of travel and observation would be necessary to arrive at a comprehension of them.

Ideas being only accessible to crowds after having assumed a very simple shape must often undergo the most thoroughgoing transformations to become popular. It is especially when we are dealing with somewhat lofty philosophic or scientific ideas that we see how far-reaching are the modifications they require in order to lower them to the level of the intelligence of crowds. These modifications are dependent on the nature of the crowds, or of the race to which the crowds belong, but their tendency is always belittling and in the direction of simplification. This explains the fact that, from the social point of view, there is in reality scarcely any such thing as a hierarchy of ideas — that is to say, as ideas of greater or less elevation. However great or true an idea may have been to begin with, it is deprived of almost all that which constituted its elevation and its greatness by the mere fact that it has come within the intellectual range of crowds and exerts an influence upon them.

Moreover, from the social point of view the hierarchical value of an idea, its intrinsic worth, is without importance. The necessary point to consider is the effects it produces. The Christian ideas of the Middle Ages, the democratic ideas of the last century, or the social ideas of to-day are assuredly not very elevated. Philosophically considered, they can only be regarded as somewhat sorry errors, and yet their power has been and will be immense, and they will count for a long time to come among the most essential factors that determine the conduct of States.

Even when an idea has undergone the transformations which render it accessible to crowds, it only exerts influence when, by various processes which we shall examine elsewhere, it has entered the domain of the unconscious, when indeed it has become a sentiment, for which much time is required.

For it must not be supposed that merely because the justness of an idea has been proved it can be productive of effective action even on cultivated minds. This fact may be quickly appreciated by noting how slight is the influence of the clearest demonstration on the majority of men. Evidence, if it be very plain, may be accepted by an educated person, but the convert will be quickly brought back by his unconscious self to his original conceptions. See him again after the lapse of a few days and he will put forward afresh his old arguments in exactly the same terms. He is in reality under the influence of anterior ideas, that have become sentiments, and it is such ideas alone that influence the more recondite motives of our acts and utterances. It cannot be otherwise in the case of crowds.

When by various processes an idea has ended by penetrating into the minds of crowds, it possesses an irresistible power, and brings about a series of effects,opposition to which is bootless. The philosophical ideas which resulted in the French Revolution took nearly a century to implant themselves in the mind of the crowd. Their irresistible force, when once they had taken root, is known. The striving of an entire nation towards the conquest of social equality, and the realisation of abstract rights and ideal liberties, caused the tottering of all thrones and profoundly disturbed the Western world. During twenty years the nations were engaged in internecine conflict, and Europe witnessed hecatombs that would have terrified Ghengis Khan and Tamerlane. The world had never seen on such a scale what may result from the promulgation of an idea.

A long time is necessary for ideas to establish themselves in the minds of crowds, but just as long a time is needed for them to be eradicated. For this reason crowds, as far as ideas are concerned, are always several generations behind learned men and philosophers. All statesmen are well aware to-day of the admixture of error contained in the fundamental ideas I referred to a short while back, but as the influence of these ideas is still very powerful they are obliged to govern in accordance with principles in the truth of which they have ceased to believe.

2. THE REASONING POWER OF CROWDS

It cannot absolutely be said that crowds do not reason and are not to be influenced by reasoning.

However, the arguments they employ and those which are capable of influencing them are, from a logical point of view, of such an inferior kind that it is only by way of analogy that they can be described as reasoning.

The inferior reasoning of crowds is based, just as is reasoning of a high order, on the association of ideas, but between the ideas associated by crowds there are only apparent bonds of analogy or succession. The mode of reasoning of crowds resembles that of the Esquimaux who, knowing from experience that ice, a transparent body, melts in the mouth, concludes that glass, also a transparent body, should also melt in the mouth; or that of the savage who imagines that by eating the heart of a courageous foe he acquires his bravery; or of the workman who, having been exploited by one employer of labour, immediately concludes that all employers exploit their men.

The characteristics of the reasoning of crowds are the association of dissimilar things possessing a merely apparent connection between each other, and the immediate generalisation of particular cases. It is arguments of this kind that are always presented to crowds by those who know how to manage them. They are the only arguments by which crowds are to be influenced. A chain of logical argumentation is totally incomprehensible to crowds, and for this reason it is permissible to say that they do not reason or that they reason falsely and are not to be influenced by reasoning. Astonishment is felt at times on reading certain speeches at their weakness, and yet they had an enormous influence on the crowds which listened to them, but it is forgotten that they were intended to persuade collectivities and not to be read by philosophers. An orator in intimate communication with a crowd can evoke images by which it will be seduced. If he is successful his object has been attained, and twenty volumes of harangues — always the outcome of reflection — are not worth the few phrases which appealed to the brains it was required to convince.

It would be superfluous to add that the powerlessness of crowds to reason aright prevents them displaying any trace of the critical spirit, prevents them, that is, from being capable of discerning truth from error, or of forming a precise judgment on any matter. Judgments accepted by crowds are merely judgments forced upon them and never judgments adopted after discussion. In regard to this matter the individuals who do not rise above the level of a crowd are numerous. The ease with which certain opinions obtain general acceptance results more especially from the impossibility experienced by the majority of men of forming an opinion peculiar to themselves and based on reasoning of their own.

3. THE IMAGINATION OF CROWDS

Just as is the case with respect to persons in whom the reasoning power is absent,the figurative imagination of crowds is very powerful, very active and very susceptible of being keenly impressed. The images evoked in their mind by a personage, an event, an accident, are almost as lifelike as the reality. Crowds are to some extent in the position of the sleeper whose reason, suspended for the time being, allows the arousing in his mind of images of extreme intensity which would quickly be dissipated could they be submitted to the action of reflection. Crowds, being incapable both of reflection and of reasoning, are devoid of the notion of improbability; and it is to be noted that in a general way it is the most improbable things that are the most striking.

This is why it happens that it is always the marvellous and legendary side of events that more specially strike crowds. When a civilisation is analysed it is seen that, in reality, it is the marvellous and the legendary that are its true supports. Appearances have always played a much more important part than reality in history, where the unreal is always of greater moment than the real.

Crowds being only capable of thinking in images are only to be impressed by images. It is only images that terrify or attract them and become motives of action.

For this reason theatrical representations, in which the image is shown in its most clearly visible shape, always have an enormous influence on crowds. Bread and spectacular shows constituted for the plebeians of ancient Rome the ideal of happiness, and they asked for nothing more. Throughout the successive ages this ideal has scarcely varied. Nothing has a greater effect on the imagination of crowds of every category than theatrical representations. The entire audience experiences at the same time the same emotions, and if these emotions are not at once transformed into acts, it is because the most unconscious spectator cannot ignore that he is the victim of illusions, and that he has laughed or wept over imaginary adventures. Sometimes, however, the sentiments suggested by the images are so strong that they tend, like habitual suggestions, to transform themselves into acts. The story has often been told of the manager of a popular theatre who, in consequence of his only playing sombre dramas, was obliged to have the actor who took the part of the traitor protected on his leaving the theatre, to defend him against the violence of the spectators, indignant at the crimes, imaginary though they were, which the traitor had committed. We have here, in my opinion, one of the most remarkable indications of the mental state of crowds, and especially of the facility with which they are suggestioned. The unreal has almost as much influence on them as the real. They have an evident tendency not to distinguish between the two.

The power of conquerors and the strength of States is based on the popular imagination. It is more particularly by working upon this imagination that crowds are led. All great historical facts, the rise of Buddhism, of Christianity, of Islamism, the Reformation, the French Revolution, and, in our own time, the threatening invasion of Socialism are the direct or indirect consequences of strong impressions produced on the imagination of the crowd.

Moreover, all the great statesmen of every age and every country, including the most absolute despots, have regarded the popular imagination as the basis of their power, and they have never attempted to govern in opposition to it "It was by becoming a Catholic, " said Napoleon to the Council of State, "that I terminated the Vendéen war. By becoming a Mussulman that I obtained a footing in Egypt. By becoming an Ultramontane that I won over the Italian priests, and had I to govern a nation of Jews I would rebuild Solomon's temple." Never perhaps since Alexander and C?sar has any great man better understood how the imagination of the crowd should be impressed. His constant preoccupation was to strike it. He bore it in mind in his victories, in his harangues, in his speeches, in all his acts. On his deathbed it was still in his thoughts.

How is the imagination of crowds to be impressed? We shall soon see. Let us confine ourselves for the moment to saying that the feat is never to be achieved by attempting to work upon the intelligence or reasoning faculty, that is to say, by way of demonstration. It was not by means of cunning rhetoric that Antony succeeded in making the populace rise against the murderers of Casar; it was by reading his will to the multitude and pointing to his corpse.

Whatever strikes the imagination of crowds presents itself under the shape of a startling and very clear image, freed from all accessory explanation, or merely having as accompaniment a few marvellous or mysterious facts: examples in point are a great victory, a great miracle, a great crime, or a great hope. Things must be laid before the crowd as a whole, and their genesis must never be indicated. A hundred petty crimes or petty accidents will not strike the imagination of crowds in the least, whereas a single great crime or a single great accident will profoundly impress them, even though the results be infinitely less disastrous than those of the hundred small accidents put together. The epidemic of influenza, which caused the death but a few years ago of five thousand persons in Paris alone, made very little impression on the popular imagination. The reason was that this veritable hecatomb was not embodied in any visible image, but was only learnt from statistical information furnished weekly. An accident which should have caused the death of only five hundred instead of five thousand persons, but on the same day and in public, as the outcome of an accident appealing strongly to the eye, by the fall, for instance, of the Eiffel Tower, would have produced, on the contrary, an immense impression on the imagination of the crowd. The probable loss of a transatlantic steamer that was supposed, in the absence of news, to have gone down in mid-ocean profoundly impressed the imagination of the crowd for a whole week. Yet official statistics show that 850 sailing vessels and 203 steamers were lost in the year 1894 alone. The crowd, however, was never for a moment concerned by these successive losses, much more important though they were as far as regards the destruction of life and property, than the loss of the Atlantic liner in question could possibly have been.

It is not, then, the facts in themselves that strike the popular imagination, but the way in which they take place and are brought under notice. It is necessary that by their condensation, if I may thus express myself, they should produce a startling image which fills and besets the mind. To know the art of impressing the imagination of crowds is to know at the same time the art of governing them.

提要：

1. 群體的觀念。最基本的以及附屬的觀念——彼此相矛盾的觀念是如何同時(shí)存在的——崇高的觀念在經(jīng)受轉(zhuǎn)變之后，才能被群體所接受——觀念的社會(huì)影響力與它所可能包括的真相的程度是沒有關(guān)聯(lián)的。

2. 群體的理性。群體并不能被推理所影響——群體的推理總是處在一種非常低俗的位置——他們所接受的觀念只有相似性或是接續(xù)性。

3. 群體的想象力。群體會(huì)用形象去進(jìn)行思考，這些形象之間并沒有任何的聯(lián)系——群體尤其會(huì)受到不可思議的事情的影響——傳奇和不可思議的事跡是文明真正的支撐物——公眾的想象力通常都是政客力量的基礎(chǔ)——能夠用事實(shí)激發(fā)群體的想象力的方式。

1.群體的觀念

我們在之前的一本著作中提出了觀念在各國發(fā)展的影響這一話題，每一個(gè)文明都是少數(shù)幾個(gè)基本觀念的產(chǎn)物，這些觀念很少能夠得到更新。我們指出，這些觀念在群體的思維中是多么的穩(wěn)固，要想對這一過程產(chǎn)生影響是多么的困難，當(dāng)它一旦實(shí)現(xiàn)之后，擁有力量的觀念就會(huì)受到質(zhì)疑。最終，我們看到，偉大的歷史波動(dòng)，一般來說，是這些基本觀念的改變。

我們已經(jīng)用非常充足的篇幅闡述了這一課題，我現(xiàn)在不想再重復(fù)了，但是，我現(xiàn)在想說幾句關(guān)于群體能夠接受觀念的這一話題，以及他們感受觀念的方式。

他們或許會(huì)被分成兩大類。其中一類是由時(shí)刻的影響產(chǎn)生的偶然的、短暫的觀念，例如那些對個(gè)人或是教條的癡迷。另一類則是基本的觀念，環(huán)境、世襲制的法律，以及公眾的言論都給予了它非常良好的穩(wěn)定性；這樣的觀念就是過去的宗教信仰，以及今天社會(huì)和民主的觀念。

這樣的基本觀念同一條小溪里面的水流非常相似；短暫的觀念就像是微小的水浪，永遠(yuǎn)都處在變化之中，它會(huì)攪動(dòng)水的表面，并且要比小溪流動(dòng)的過程還要顯而易見，盡管它并不具備真正的重要性。

現(xiàn)在，那些偉大的基本觀念都是我們的先父視為不可動(dòng)搖的主流思想，它們正在搖搖欲墜。它們已經(jīng)失去了所有的穩(wěn)定性，與此同時(shí)，那些構(gòu)建在它們之上的制度也受到了極其嚴(yán)重的動(dòng)搖。每一天，在這里都會(huì)形成很多我之前有提到過的短暫的觀念；但是，在它們當(dāng)中只有極少的觀念可以獲得活力，并且具備占據(jù)壓倒性優(yōu)勢的影響力。

無論提供給群體的觀念是什么，它們都只有在被看作是非常絕對、堅(jiān)定，并且簡單的條件下，才能施展具有效力的影響力。因此，它們出現(xiàn)在形象的假象之下，并且只能被隱藏在這一形式的大眾所接受。這些類似形象的觀念同任何類似性或是接續(xù)性的邏輯紐帶都無任何關(guān)聯(lián)，它們之間可以相互替代，就像是操縱者從早期幻燈機(jī)中抽出疊放在一起的幻燈片一樣。這解釋了為什么能夠看到大多數(shù)的矛盾觀念會(huì)同時(shí)在群體中盛行。依照時(shí)機(jī)的變化，一個(gè)群體會(huì)處在理解力的范疇內(nèi)眾多觀念中的一個(gè)觀念的影響之下，并且，因此具備做出非同凡響的事情的能力。群體完全缺乏具有批判的精神，所以它們無法感知到這些矛盾的存在。

這樣的現(xiàn)象并不是群體所特有的。在很多獨(dú)立的個(gè)人身上也能夠觀察到這樣的現(xiàn)象，不單單能夠在原始的物種身上，還包括在智力的某個(gè)方面接近原始物種的人，比如一個(gè)具有宗教信仰的狂熱的宗派成員。我曾經(jīng)觀察過，在我們這些歐洲的大學(xué)受過教育，并且獲得了學(xué)位的印度人身上，就曾令人驚奇地表現(xiàn)出了這樣的現(xiàn)象。一些西方的觀念疊加在了那些無法改變、基本的世襲制或社會(huì)觀念之上。依照場合的變化，這一種，或是另一種觀念就會(huì)呈現(xiàn)出來，而且還會(huì)伴隨有相應(yīng)的行為和言語，在這樣的情況之下，同一個(gè)個(gè)人會(huì)表現(xiàn)出令人難以容忍的矛盾。這些矛盾要比真相更加顯而易見，因?yàn)橹挥惺酪u制的觀念才會(huì)對獨(dú)立的個(gè)人產(chǎn)生足夠的影響，并且成為他的行為動(dòng)機(jī)。只有當(dāng)一個(gè)人在不同種族的混雜的作用之下，而處于不同世襲制傾向當(dāng)中，他的行為會(huì)時(shí)不時(shí)地呈現(xiàn)出完全矛盾的狀態(tài)。盡管這些心理學(xué)的重要性非常重要，但是，在這里過多重視這些現(xiàn)象是徒勞的。我的觀點(diǎn)是，要想對這些現(xiàn)象有一個(gè)深刻的理解，花費(fèi)至少十年時(shí)間用于旅行和觀察是尤為必要的。

觀念只有在被轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)榉浅：唵蚊髁说男问?，才能被廣大的群體所接受，想要變得廣受大眾歡迎，就必須經(jīng)受最為徹底的轉(zhuǎn)變。尤其是，當(dāng)我們處理一些崇高的哲學(xué)或是科學(xué)的觀念時(shí)，我們會(huì)看到，它們?yōu)榱税炎约航档饺后w智商的程度，需要作出何等影響深遠(yuǎn)的修改。這些修改取決于群體的天性，或是群體所屬的種族的天性，但是它們的傾向總是帶有觀念的貶低化和簡單化。這些能夠解釋，從社會(huì)的觀點(diǎn)來看，現(xiàn)實(shí)中很少有類似世襲制的觀念的事實(shí)——也就是說，級別有高低之分的觀念。無論一個(gè)觀念起初有多么的崇高或是多么的低俗，那些包含等級和偉大的因素，僅僅從進(jìn)入到群體的智商范圍，并且對他們起到了作用，就會(huì)被剝奪殆盡的事實(shí)。

但是，從社會(huì)的觀點(diǎn)來看，一個(gè)觀念的等級制價(jià)值，它的固有的價(jià)值，是微不足道的。值得需要考慮的一點(diǎn)就是，隨之產(chǎn)生出來的效果。中世紀(jì)的基督教徒的觀念，上個(gè)世紀(jì)的民主觀念，或是現(xiàn)在的社會(huì)觀念，都稱不上是高尚的觀念。從哲學(xué)的觀點(diǎn)出發(fā)去考慮，它們只能被看作或多或少存在缺陷的錯(cuò)誤，然而，它們的力量卻是無窮無盡的，在未來很長的一段時(shí)間里，它們都將會(huì)是決定國家行為最必不可少的因素。

即使當(dāng)一個(gè)觀念經(jīng)受了轉(zhuǎn)變，成為能夠被群體所接受的觀念，它也只能在進(jìn)入到無意識(shí)的領(lǐng)域，成為一種情感——這需要很長的時(shí)間，才能產(chǎn)生影響，在其中所產(chǎn)生的種種過程，我們將在下文進(jìn)行闡述。

我們?nèi)f萬不能認(rèn)為，僅僅是因?yàn)橐粋€(gè)觀念的公正性能夠被證實(shí)，就會(huì)產(chǎn)生富有效力的行為，甚至被有文化修養(yǎng)的思維所接受。我們可以看一下最清晰的證據(jù)能夠給大多數(shù)人帶來多么微不足道的影響，就能夠很快證明這一事實(shí)。如果證據(jù)非常清晰，它或許會(huì)被有教養(yǎng)的人接受，但是，那些信徒們會(huì)很快被他自我的無意識(shí)狀態(tài)帶回到原有的概念之中。過去幾天之后，再看他，他依舊會(huì)用完全相同的觀點(diǎn)闡述他之前的論證。在現(xiàn)實(shí)中，他仍舊處在一個(gè)被以往觀念的影響下，它們已經(jīng)變成了情感，只有這樣的情感影響著我們的行為和言語中最為隱秘的動(dòng)機(jī)。群體的情況也不例外。

當(dāng)一個(gè)觀念通過多種方式，最終貫穿到群體的思維當(dāng)中，擁有了不可抵抗的力量，帶來了一系列的影響，那么同它作對就顯得毫無用處。在法國大革命中產(chǎn)生的哲學(xué)觀念花費(fèi)了將近一個(gè)世紀(jì)的時(shí)間才被灌輸進(jìn)群體的思維之中。一旦它們站穩(wěn)了腳跟，它們不可抗拒的力量就會(huì)變得家喻戶曉。整個(gè)國家對于社會(huì)公正性的苦苦追求，抽象權(quán)利和理想的自由的實(shí)現(xiàn)，動(dòng)搖了所有的王權(quán)，并且深刻地?cái)噥y了整個(gè)西方世界。在二十年的時(shí)間里，各個(gè)國家都處在兩敗俱傷的沖突之中，歐洲見證了甚至令成吉思汗見了都會(huì)發(fā)顫的大屠殺，這個(gè)世界還從未見證過因?yàn)橐环N觀念的散播，從而導(dǎo)致如此巨大規(guī)模的慘痛史實(shí)。

觀念要想建立在群體的思維之中，需要相當(dāng)長的一段時(shí)間，但是，要想從他們的思維中去除這樣的觀念也需要同樣長的時(shí)間。所以，從觀念來看，群體總是走在幾代有學(xué)識(shí)的人和哲學(xué)家的后面。所有的政客都能很好地意識(shí)到今天包含在我在之前提到過的基本觀念之中的錯(cuò)誤，不過這些理念的影響力依然十分強(qiáng)大，它們不得不依據(jù)它們停止信仰的真相的法則去進(jìn)行統(tǒng)治。

2.群體的理性

我們不能絕對地說，群體沒有理性，并且也不能夠被理性所影響。

然而，他們所能接受的論證，那些能夠影響他們的論證，從一個(gè)邏輯的觀點(diǎn)來看，屬于一種低俗的論證，因此把它描述成理性，只是說是一種比喻。

就如同一個(gè)高級的論證一樣，較為低級的群體理性也是以觀念為基礎(chǔ)的，但是在由群體所持有的觀念之中，只有顯而易見的類比或是接續(xù)的紐帶。群體論證的模式同愛斯基摩人的非常相似，他們從親身體驗(yàn)中得知，冰是一種透明的物質(zhì)，放在嘴里就會(huì)融化；他們又如同野蠻人一樣，通過想象自己吃掉一個(gè)勇敢的敵人的心臟來獲得他的膽量；或是，一些工人被雇者剝削，立刻認(rèn)為所有的雇傭者都會(huì)剝削他們手下的勞工。

群體的理性特點(diǎn)就是把在兩者之間擁有顯著關(guān)系的非同凡響的事物聯(lián)系在一起，并且迅速把特殊的事物普遍化。知道如何管理群體的人，總會(huì)被提供類似這樣的論證。它們是能夠影響群體的唯一論證。一系列的邏輯論證是完全不能夠被群體所理解的，正因?yàn)檫@個(gè)原因，我們可以說，他們不會(huì)推理，或是說，他們的推理是錯(cuò)誤的，并且不受到推理的影響。在閱讀演講稿的時(shí)候，多留意一下其中的弱點(diǎn)，你就會(huì)感到吃驚不已，不過，它們卻會(huì)對聆聽它們的群體產(chǎn)生巨大的影響，人們已經(jīng)忘記了，它們是要說服群體，而不是供哲學(xué)家閱讀的。一個(gè)演說家只有在和一個(gè)群體進(jìn)行非常親密的溝通時(shí)，才能誘發(fā)能夠?qū)λ麄儺a(chǎn)生誘惑力的形象。只要是他能成功做到這一點(diǎn)，他的目標(biāo)就算達(dá)到了，20卷喋喋不休的高談闊論——這始終是思考的產(chǎn)物——與其這樣，倒不如講一些能夠?qū)λf服的大腦具有感召力的話語。

進(jìn)一步闡述群體不具備進(jìn)行論證的能力，所以，它也不能呈現(xiàn)出任何具有批判的精神，實(shí)屬多此一舉，也就是說，它并不具備辨別真相和虛假的能力，或是對任何的事物做出準(zhǔn)確的判斷能力。被群體所接受的判斷，僅僅只是被強(qiáng)加在他們身上的判斷，而從來都不是經(jīng)過爭論之后才做出的判斷。在這一方面，也有數(shù)不盡的人無法達(dá)到群體的水平。一些意見不費(fèi)吹灰之力就能夠普遍被公眾所接受，產(chǎn)生這樣結(jié)果的原因是因?yàn)榇蟛糠秩烁杏X，他們不可能依照自身的論證來形成自己所特有的意見。

3.群體的想象力

就好比論證能力匱乏的人一樣，群體比喻的想象力非常強(qiáng)大、活躍，而且非常敏感，由一個(gè)人物、一個(gè)事件、一場事故在他們的腦海里引發(fā)的形象十分逼真，幾乎全都像是真的一樣。從某種程度上來說，群體就好比一個(gè)正在睡覺的人，他的論證被時(shí)間所擱置了，所以，他的大腦中能夠喚起極端逼真的想象，但是，他們就算能夠進(jìn)行思考，這種形象也會(huì)很快就開始消散。群體既不能思考也不能論證，它們持有沒有什么事情是辦不到的概念，值得注意的是，通常來講，最不可能的事情往往是最引人注目的事情。

這就是為什么事件的神奇和傳奇之處往往能夠給群體留下極其深刻的印象。當(dāng)一個(gè)文明被分析過后，你會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)在現(xiàn)實(shí)當(dāng)中，那些神奇和傳奇的事跡給予了文明真正的支持。從歷史上來看，事物的表面現(xiàn)象往往扮演著比現(xiàn)實(shí)更加重要的角色，不真實(shí)的因素總是要比真實(shí)的因素更加重要。

那些只能通過形象來進(jìn)行思考的群體只能被形象所打動(dòng)。只有形象才會(huì)恐嚇或是吸引它們，并且成為行動(dòng)的動(dòng)機(jī)。

正因?yàn)檫@個(gè)原因，最能清晰、如實(shí)地展現(xiàn)出人物形象的戲劇表演，往往會(huì)對群體產(chǎn)生巨大的影響。在古羅馬平民的眼里，面包以及壯觀的表演構(gòu)成了幸福的理想狀態(tài)，他們已經(jīng)別無他求了。在之后的時(shí)代里，這樣的理想狀態(tài)幾乎沒有發(fā)生過改變。沒有什么事要比戲劇表演更能對各個(gè)種類的群體的想象力產(chǎn)生巨大的影響力。與此同時(shí)，所有的觀眾都感受到了相同的情感，如果這些情感并不是在一瞬間轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)樾袆?dòng)，那就是因?yàn)樽顭o意識(shí)的觀眾也無法忽視他是假象的犧牲品，他會(huì)開懷大笑或是悲傷落淚，都是因?yàn)槟切{空想象出來的冒險(xiǎn)經(jīng)歷。然而，有的時(shí)候，由暗示所引發(fā)的情感卻非常強(qiáng)大，它們傾向于習(xí)慣性的暗示，將它們轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)樾袆?dòng)。我們經(jīng)常能夠聽到這樣的故事，一個(gè)著名劇院的經(jīng)理只不過是演出了一個(gè)讓人心情低落的戲劇，就不得不在飾演叛國者離開劇院的時(shí)候保護(hù)他，以防止他受到的對罪行感到憤憤不平的觀眾的惡意襲擊，盡管叛國者所犯下的罪行都是憑空想象出來的。依照我的觀點(diǎn)來看，我們在這里所看到的是群體心理狀態(tài)中最為卓越的象征之一，尤其是對其施加影響的非凡表現(xiàn)。不真實(shí)對其施加的影響力就如同真實(shí)的一樣巨大。它們具有非常明顯的無法在這兩者之間進(jìn)行區(qū)別的傾向。

侵略者和國家的力量都是以群體的想象力為基礎(chǔ)的。在指引群體的時(shí)候，特別要在這樣的想象力上面做好工作。所有偉大的歷史真相，佛教、基督教、伊斯蘭教的興起，宗教的改革，法國大革命，以及在我們生活的時(shí)代，具有威脅性的社會(huì)主義入侵，都是由群體的想象力產(chǎn)生的強(qiáng)大影響所造成的直接或者間接的結(jié)果。

而且，在任何的時(shí)代，任何的國家里，所有偉大的政治家，包括最專制的暴君，都認(rèn)為群體的想象力是他們力量的基礎(chǔ)，他們從未嘗試通過同它相抗?fàn)巵磉M(jìn)行統(tǒng)治。拿破侖在國會(huì)上說過：“通過對天主教的革新，我終止了旺代戰(zhàn)爭。通過成為一名穆斯林教徒，我在埃及站穩(wěn)了腳跟。通過成為一名信奉教皇至上的人，我贏得了意大利牧師的信任，倘若我可以去統(tǒng)治猶太人的國家，那么我也會(huì)重新修建所羅門的神殿?！被蛟S自從亞歷山大和愷撒以來，就從來都沒有任何一個(gè)人能夠很好地了解群體的想象力應(yīng)該如何被影響。他毫不停歇、全身心投入的事情，就是劇烈地作用于這一想象力。他把這一點(diǎn)銘記在他的勝利中、他的高談闊論、他的演講，以及他所有的行動(dòng)之中。即使是到了他臨死的時(shí)候，他躺在床上，這一點(diǎn)依舊保存在他的思想里。

那么，應(yīng)該如何影響群體的想象力呢？我們很快就會(huì)見分曉。在這里，我們僅需要說出，偉大的壯舉永遠(yuǎn)也不能靠通過嘗試做好智力或是論證能力的工作就可以實(shí)現(xiàn)的，也就是說，完全不能采取展示的方式。安東尼之所以能夠成功讓普通的民眾揭竿而起對抗殺死愷撒的兇手，并不是通過狡猾的花言巧語，而是讓人民群眾能夠讀出他的意愿，并且用手指向愷撒的尸體。

無論猛烈刺激群體想象力的東西到底是什么，它都會(huì)以一種令人驚異，非常透徹的形式展現(xiàn)在我們的面前，不需要任何多余的解釋，或是只伴隨有幾個(gè)神奇的或是神秘的真相：與此相關(guān)的事例是非常偉大的勝利，一個(gè)非常神奇的奇跡，一個(gè)臭名昭著的罪行，或是一個(gè)崇高的希望。事情必須被擺在作為一個(gè)整體的群體面前，他們的起源必須永遠(yuǎn)也不能被提及。一百個(gè)微不足道的罪行，或是不值一提的事故，永遠(yuǎn)也不會(huì)猛烈地刺激群體的想象力，然而，單個(gè)的罪行，或是單個(gè)的事故就會(huì)對它們產(chǎn)生非常深刻的影響，即使產(chǎn)生的結(jié)果遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)要比那些把上百個(gè)小事故加在一起所產(chǎn)生的傷害還低。在幾年前，流行性感冒這種疾病，單單在巴黎就導(dǎo)致了五千人死亡，但是這并未給群體的想象力帶來任何影響。原因在于這種名副其實(shí)的大屠殺并未包含在任何可見的形象之中，而是通過每周更新的統(tǒng)計(jì)信息來獲得的。倘若一起事故造成了五百人而并非五千人死亡，但是這一事故引發(fā)的死亡人數(shù)在同一天被提供給公眾，那它就會(huì)成為頗具吸引力的事件，舉個(gè)例子，如果埃菲爾鐵塔轟然倒塌，就會(huì)對群體的想象力帶來非常巨大的影響力。群眾在沒有獲得新聞報(bào)道的情況之下，認(rèn)為一艘穿越大西洋的蒸汽機(jī)船可能在大西洋沉沒了，這一事件足足影響了群體想象力一周的時(shí)間。然而，據(jù)官方的統(tǒng)計(jì)數(shù)字顯示，僅在1894年這一年當(dāng)中，就有850艘輪船和203艘蒸汽機(jī)船在大西洋中失去了蹤影。就從造成的生命和財(cái)產(chǎn)損失來看，這些船只的失蹤要比那次大西洋海船的沉沒帶來的損失要大得多，但是，無論何時(shí)，群體永遠(yuǎn)也不會(huì)考慮這些連續(xù)的事故。

刺激群體想象力的并不是真相本身，而是它們產(chǎn)生并且被人們注意的方式。如果我可以自由發(fā)表我自己的言論的話，那么我會(huì)說，務(wù)必要對它們進(jìn)行濃縮，它們會(huì)產(chǎn)生一種充斥思維的、令人感到驚異的形象。只要了解了影響群體想象力的藝術(shù)，就能夠在同時(shí)了解到統(tǒng)治它們的藝術(shù)。