There is a want of appositeness and accuracy in the first sentence of this extract,which renders it somewhat difficult to determine whether the author designed it as a single proposition,or as a series of independent propositions.If the first,there is not one person in the United States,it is presumed,who would venture to differ from him.I confess,however,I do not very clearly discern what bearing it has on the question he was examining.It involves no point of difference between political parties,nor does it propound any question which has heretofore been contested,or which may be expected to arise hereafter,touching the true nature of the Constitution.If he designed a series of propositions,then the two first are so obviously false,that Judge Story himself would not venture to maintain them,and the last is so obviously true,that no one would dream of denying it.For example:he can scarcely mean to say that our government is not a "contract"whether made by the States as such,or by "the people of the United States";and it is perfectly clear that it "contemplates the permanent subsistence of the parties to it,"whoever those parties may be.These two propositions,therefore,taken distinctly,are not true in themselves,and neither of them was necessary,as qualifying or forming a part,of the third.And,as to the third,it is not easy to see why he announced it,since it never entered into the conception of any one,that the parties to the Constitution had "an independent right,"as a general right,"to construe,control or judge of its obligations."We all admit that the power and authority of the Federal Government,within its constitutional sphere,are superior to those of the States,in some instances,and co-ordinate in others,and that every citizen is under an absolute obligation to render them respect and obedience:and this simply because his own State,by the act of ratifying the Constitution,has commanded him to do so.We all admit it to be true,as a general proposition,that no citizen nor State has an independent right to "construe,"and still less to "control"the constitutional obligations of that government,and that neither a citizen nor a State can "judge,"that is,decide,on the nature and extent of those obligations,with a view to control them.All that was ever contended for is,that a State has a right to judge of its own obligations,and,consequently,to judge of those of the Federal Government,so far as they relate to such State itself,and no farther.It is admitted on all hands,that when the Federal Government transcends its constitutional power,and when,of course,it is not acting within its "obligations,"the parties to that government,whoever they may be,are no longer under any duty to respect or obey it.

This has been repeatedly affirmed by our courts,both State and federal,and has never been denied by any class of politicians.Who,then,is to determine whether it has so transcended its constitutional obligations or not?It is admitted that,to a certain extent,the Supreme Court is the proper tribunal in the last resort,because the States,in establishing that tribunal,have expressly agreed to make it so.The jurisdiction of the federal courts extends to certain cases,affecting the rights of the individual citizens,and to certain others affecting those of the individual States.So far as the Federal Government is authorized to act on the individual citizen,the powers of the one and the rights of the other,are properly determinable by the federal courts.And the decision is binding too,and absolutely final,so far as the relation of the citizen to the Federal Government is concerned.There is not,within that system,any tribunal of appeal,from the decisions of the Supreme Court.And so also of those cases in which the rights of the States are referred to the federal tribunals.

In this sense,and to this extent,it is strictly true that the parties have not "an independent right to construe,control and judge of the obligations"

Of the Federal Government,but they are bound by the decisions of the federal courts,so far as they have authorized and agreed to submit to them.But there are many cases involving the question of federal power which are not cognizable before the federal courts;and,of course,as to these,we must look out for some other umpire.It is precisely in this case that the question,who are the parties to the Constitution,becomes all important and controlling.If the States are parties as sovereign States,then it follows,as a necessary consequence,that each of them has the right which belongs to every sovereignty,to construe its own contracts and agreements,and to decide upon its own rights and powers.I shall take occasion,in a subsequent part of this review,to enter more fully into the question,who is the common umpire?The statement here given,of the leading point of difference between the great political parties of the country,is designed only to show that the author's proposition does not involve it.That proposition may mislead the judgment of the reader,but cannot possibly enlighten it,in regard to the true nature of the Constitution.