Second Treatise of Government

John Lock

Chapter IX

Of the Ends of Political Society and Government

123. IF man in the state of Nature be so free as has been said, if he be absolute lord of his own person and possessions, equal to the greatest and subject to nobody, why will he part with his freedom, this empire, and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? To which it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of Nature he hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for all being kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure. This makes him willing to quit this condition which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers; and it is not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name-property.

124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealths,and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property;to which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting.

Firstly, there wants an established, settled, known law, received and allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and the common measure to decide all controversies between them. For though the law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures, yet men, being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their particular cases.

125. Secondly, in the state of Nature there wants a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law. For every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law of Nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt to carry them too far, and with too much heat in their own cases, as well as negligence and unconcernedness, make them too remiss in other men's.

126. Thirdly, in the state of Nature there often wants power to back and support the sentence when right, and to give it due execution. They who by any injustice offended will seldom fail where they are able by force to make good their injustice. Such resistance many times makes the punishment dangerous, and frequently destructive to those who attempt it.

127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of Nature, being but in an ill condition while they remain in it are quickly driven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they are therein exposed to by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power every man has of punishing the transgressions of others, make them take sanctuary under the established laws of government, and therein seek the preservation of their property. It is this that makes them so willingly give up every one his single power of punishing to be exercised by such alone as shall be appointed to it amongst them, and by such rules as the community, or those authorised by them to that purpose, shall agree on. And in this we have the original right and rise of both the legislative and executive power as well as of the governments and societies themselves.

128. For in the state of Nature to omit the liberty he has of innocent delights, a man has two powers. The first is to do whatsoever he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others within the permission of the law of Nature;by which law, common to them all, he and all the rest of mankind are one community, make up one society distinct from all other creatures, and were it not for the corruption and viciousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other, no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural community, and associate into lesser combinations. The other power a man has in the state of Nature is the power to punish the crimes committed against that law. Both these he gives up when he joins in a private, if I may so call it, or particular political society, and incorporates into any commonwealth separate from the rest of mankind.

129. The first power-viz., of doing whatsoever he thought fit for the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind, he gives up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the preservation of himself and the rest of that society shall require; which laws of the society in many things confine the liberty he had by the law of Nature.

130. Secondly, the power of punishing he wholly gives up, and engages his natural force, which he might before employ in the execution of the law of Nature, by his own single authority, as he thought fit, to assist the executive power of the society as the law thereof shall require. For being now in a new state, wherein he is to enjoy many conveniencies from the labour, assistance, and society of others in the same community, as well as protection from its whole strength, he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the society shall require, which is not only necessary but just, since the other members of the society do the like. 131. But though men when they enter into society give up the equality,liberty, and executive power they had in the state of Nature into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative as the good of the society shall require, yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse), the power of the society or legislative constituted by them can never be supposed to extend farther than the common good, but is obliged to secure every one's property by providing against those three defects above mentioned that made the state of Nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so, whoever has the legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people, and not by extemporary decrees, by indifferent and upright judges, who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the force of the community at home only in the execution of such laws, or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries and secure the community from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed to no other end but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.

Chapter X

Of the Forms of a Commonwealth

132. THE majority having, as has been showed, upon men's first uniting into society, the whole power of the community naturally in them, may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to time, and executing those laws by officers of their own appointing, and then the form of the government is a perfect democracy; or else may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few select men, and their heirs or successors, and then it is an oligarchy; or else into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy;if to him and his heirs, it is a hereditary monarchy; if to him only for life, but upon his death the power only of nominating a successor, to return to them, an elective monarchy. And so accordingly of these make compounded and mixed forms of government, as they think good. And if the legislative power be at first given by the majority to one or more persons only for their lives, or any limited time, and then the supreme power to revert to them again, when it is so reverted the community may dispose of it again anew into what hands they please, and so constitute a new form of government; for the form of government depending upon the placing the supreme power, which is the legislative, it being impossible to conceive that an inferior power should prescribe to a superior, or any but the supreme make laws, according as the power of making laws is placed, such is the form of the commonwealth.

133. By “commonwealth” I must be understood all along to mean not a democracy, or any form of government, but any independent community which the Latins signified by the word civitas, to which the word which best answers in our language is “commonwealth,” and most properly expresses such a society of men which “community” does not (for there may be subordinate communities in a government), and “city” much less. And therefore, to avoid ambiguity, I crave leave to use the word “commonwealth” in that sense, in which sense I find the word used by King James himself, which I think to be its genuine signification, which, if anybody dislike, I consent with him to change it for a better.

Chapter XI

Of the Extent of the Legislative Power

134. THE great end of men's entering into society being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and means of that being the laws established in that society, the first and fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the legislative power, as the first and fundamental natural law which is to govern even the legislative. Itself is the preservation of the society and (as far as will consist with the public good)of every person in it. This legislative is not only the supreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it. Nor can any edict of anybody else, in what form soever conceived, or by what power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a law which has not its sanction from that legislative which the public has chosen and appointed; for without this the law could not have that which is absolutely necessary to its being a law, the consent of the society, over whom nobody can have a power to make laws* but by their own consent and by authority received from them; and therefore all the obedience, which by the most solemn ties any one can be obliged to pay, ultimately terminates in this supreme power, and is directed by those laws which it enacts. Nor can any oaths to any foreign power whatsoever, or any domestic subordinate power, discharge any member of the society from his obedience to the legislative, acting pursuant to their trust, nor oblige him to any obedience contrary to the laws so enacted or farther than they do allow, it being ridiculous to imagine one can be tied ultimately to obey any power in the society which is not the supreme.

“The lawful power of making laws to command whole politic societies of men, belonging so properly unto the same entire societies, that for any prince or potentate, of what kind soever upon earth, to exercise the same of himself, and not by express commission immediately and personally received from God, or else by authority derived at the first from their consent, upon whose persons they impose laws, it is no better than mere tyranny. Laws they are not, therefore, which public approbation hath not made so.”Hooker,ibid.10.

Of this point, therefore, we are to note that such men naturally have no full and perfect power to command whole politic multitudes of men, therefore utterly without our consent we could in such sort be at no man's commandment living. And to be commanded, we do consent when that society, whereof we be a part, hath at any time before consented, without revoking the same after by the like universal agreement.“Laws therefore human, of what kind soever, are available by consent.”Hooker, Ibid.

135. Though the legislative, whether placed in one or more, whether it be always in being or only by intervals, though it be the supreme power in every commonwealth, yet, first, it is not, nor can possibly be, absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people. For it being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that person or assembly which is legislator, it can be no more than those persons had in a state of Nature before they entered into society, and gave it up to the community. For nobody can transfer to another more power than he has in himself, and nobody has an absolute arbitrary power over himself, or over any other, to destroy his own life, or take away the life or property of another. A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of another; and having, in the state of Nature, no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as the law of Nature gave him for the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind, this is all he doth, or can give up to the commonwealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the legislative can have no more than this. Their power in the utmost bounds of it is limited to the public good of the society. It is a power that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects; the obligations of the law of Nature cease not in society, but only in many cases are drawn closer, and have, by human laws, known penalties annexed to them to enforce their observation. Thus the law of Nature stands as an eternal rule to all men, legislators as well as others. The rules that they make for, other men's actions must, as well as their own and other men's actions, be conformable to the law of Nature-i.e., to the will of God, of which that is a declaration, and the fundamental law of Nature being the preservation of mankind, no human sanction can be good or valid against it.

“Two foundations there are which bear up public societies; the one a natural inclination whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship; the other an order, expressly or secretly agreed upon, touching the manner of their union in living together. The latter is that which we call the law of a commonweal, the very soul of a politic body, the parts whereof are by law animated, held together, and set on work in such actions as the common good requireth. Laws politic, ordained for external order and regimen amongst men, are never framed as they should be, unless presuming the will of man to be inwardly obstinate, rebellious, and averse from all obedience to the sacred laws of his nature; in a word, unless presuming man to be in regard of his depraved mind little better than a wild beast, they do accordingly provide notwithstanding, so to frame his outward actions, that they be no hindrance unto the common good, for which societies are instituted.Unless they do this they are not perfect.”Hooker,Eccl.Pol.i.10.

136. Secondly, the legislative or supreme authority cannot assume to itself a power to rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees, but is bound to dispense justice and decide the rights of the subject by promulgated standing laws, * and known authorised judges. For the law of Nature being unwritten, and so nowhere to be found but in the minds of men, they who, through passion or interest, shall miscite or misapply it, cannot so easily be convinced of their mistake where there is no established judge; and so it serves not as it aught, to determine the rights and fence the properties of those that live under it, especially where every one is judge, interpreter, and executioner of it too, and that in his own case;and he that has right on his side, having ordinarily but his own single strength, hath not force enough to defend himself from injuries or punish delinquents. To avoid these inconveniencies which disorder men's properties in the state of Nature, men unite into societies that they may have the united strength of the whole society to secure and defend their properties, and may have standing rules to bound it by which every one may know what is his. To this end it is that men give up all their natural power to the society they enter into, and the community put the legislative power into such hands as they think fit, with this trust, that they shall be governed by declared laws, or else their peace, quiet, and property will still be at the same uncertainty as it was in the state of Nature.

“Human laws are measures in respect of men whose actions they must direct, howbeit such measures they are as have also their higher rules to be measured by, which rules are two-the law of God and the law of Nature; so that laws human must be made according to the general laws of Nature, and without contradiction to any positive law of Scripture, otherwise they are ill made.”Hooker, Eccl. Pol. iii. 9.

“To constrain men to anything inconvenient doth seem unreasonable.”Ibid. i. 10.

137. Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government, which men would not quit the freedom of the state of Nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties, and fortunes, and by stated rules of right and property to secure their peace and quiet. It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so to do, to give any one or more an absolute arbitrary power over their persons and estates, and put a force into the magistrate's hand to execute his unlimited will arbitrarily upon them; this were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of Nature, wherein they had a liberty to defend their right against the injuries of others, and were upon equal terms of force to maintain it, whether invaded by a single man or many in combination. Whereas by supposing they have given up themselves to the absolute arbitrary power and will of a legislator, they have disarmed themselves, and armed him to make a prey of them when he pleases;he being in a much worse condition that is exposed to the arbitrary power of one man who has the command of a hundred thousand than he that is exposed to the arbitrary power of a hundred thousand single men, nobody being secure, that his will who has such a command is better than that of other men, though his force be a hundred thousand times stronger. And, therefore, whatever form the commonwealth is under, the ruling power ought to govern by declared and received laws, and not by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions, for then mankind will be in a far worse condition than in the state of Nature if they shall have armed one or a few men with the joint power of a multitude, to force them to obey at pleasure the exorbitant and unlimited decrees of their sudden thoughts, or unrestrained, and till that moment, unknown wills, without having any measures set down which may guide and justify their actions. For all the power the government has, being only for the good of the society, as it ought not to be arbitrary and at pleasure, so it ought to be exercised by established and promulgated laws, that both the people may know their duty, and be safe and secure within the limits of the law, and the rulers, too, kept within their due bounds, and not be tempted by the power they have in their hands to employ it to purposes, and by such measures as they would not have known, and own not willingly.

138. Thirdly, the supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his own consent. For the preservation of property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires that the people should have property, without which they must be supposed to lose that by entering into society which was the end for which they entered into it; too gross an absurdity for any man to own. Men, therefore, in society having property, they have such a right to the goods, which by the law of the community are theirs, that nobody hath a right to take them, or any part of them, from them without their own consent; without this they have no property at all. For I have truly no property in that which another can by right take from me when he pleases against my consent. Hence it is a mistake to think that the supreme or legislative power of any commonwealth can do what it will, and dispose of the estates of the subject arbitrarily, or take any part of them at pleasure. This is not much to be feared in governments where the legislative consists wholly or in part in assemblies which are variable, whose members upon the dissolution of the assembly are subjects under the common laws of their country, equally with the rest. But in governments where the legislative is in one lasting assembly, always in being, or in one man as in absolute monarchies, there is danger still, that they will think themselves to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community, and so will be apt to increase their own riches and power by taking what they think fit from the people. For a man's property is not at all secure, though there be good and equitable laws to set the bounds of it between him and his fellow-subjects, if he who commands those subjects have power to take from any private man what part he pleases of his property, and use and dispose of it as he thinks good.

139. But government, into whosesoever hands it is put, being as I have before shown, entrusted with this condition, and for this end, that men might have and secure their properties, the prince or senate, however it may have power to make laws for the regulating of property between the subjects one amongst another, yet can never have a power to take to themselves the whole, or any part of the subjects' property, without their own consent; for this would be in effect to leave them no property at all. And to let us see that even absolute power, where it is necessary, is not arbitrary by being absolute, but is still limited by that reason and confined to those ends which required it in some cases to be absolute, we need look no farther than the common practice of martial discipline. For the preservation of the army, and in it of the whole commonwealth, requires an absolute obedience to the command of every superior officer, and it is justly death to disobey or dispute the most dangerous or unreasonable of them; but yet we see that neither the sergeant that could command a soldier to march up to the mouth of a cannon, or stand in a breach where he is almost sure to perish, can command that soldier to give him one penny of his money; nor the general that can condemn him to death for deserting his post, or not obeying the most desperate orders, cannot yet with all his absolute power of life and death dispose of one farthing of that soldier's estate, or seize one jot of his goods; whom yet he can command anything, and hang for the least disobedience. Because such a blind obedience is necessary to that end for which the commander has his powerviz.,the preservation of the rest,but the disposing of his goods has nothing to do with it.

140. It is true governments cannot be supported without great charge, and it is fit every one who enjoys his share of the protection should pay out of his estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his own consent-i.e., the consent of the majority, giving it either by themselves or their representatives chosen by them; for if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people by his own authority, and without such consent of the people, he thereby invades the fundamental law of property, and subverts the end of government. For what property have I in that which another may by right take when he pleases to himself?

141. Fourthly. The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands, for it being but a delegated power from the people, they who have it cannot pass it over to others. The people alone can appoint the form of the commonwealth, which is by constituting the legislative, and appointing in whose hands that shall be.And when the people have said,“We will submit,and be governed by laws made by such men,and in such forms,” nobody else can say other men shall make laws for them; nor can they be bound by any laws but such as are enacted by those whom they have chosen and authorised to make laws for them.

142. These are the bounds which the trust that is put in them by the society and the law of God and Nature have set to the legislative power of every commonwealth, in all forms of government.Firstly: They are to govern by promulgated established laws, not to be varied in particular cases, but to have one rule for rich and poor, for the favourite at Court, and the countryman at plough.Secondly: These laws also ought to be designed for no other end ultimately but the good of the people.Thirdly:They must not raise taxes on the property of the people without the consent of the people given by themselves or their deputies. And this properly concerns only such governments where the legislative is always in being, or at least where the people have not reserved any part of the legislative to deputies, to be from time to time chosen by themselves. Fourthly:Legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have.

Chapter XII

The Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power of the Commonwealth

143. THE legislative power is that which has a right to direct how the force of the commonwealth shall be employed for preserving the community and the members of it. Because those laws which are constantly to be executed, and whose force is always to continue, may be made in a little time, therefore there is no need that the legislative should be always in being, not having always business to do. And because it may be too great temptation to human frailty, apt to grasp at power, for the same persons who have the power of making laws to have also in their hands the power to execute them, whereby they may exempt themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law, both in its making and execution, to their own private advantage, and thereby come to have a distinct interest from the rest of the community, contrary to the end of society and government. Therefore in well-ordered commonwealths, where the good of the whole is so considered as it ought, the legislative power is put into the hands of divers persons who, duly assembled, have by themselves, or jointly with others, a power to make laws, which when they have done, being separated again, they are themselves subject to the laws they have made; which is a new and near tie upon them to take care that they make them for the public good.

144. But because the laws that are at once, and in a short time made, have a constant and lasting force, and need a perpetual execution, or an attendance thereunto, therefore it is necessary there should be a power always in being which should see to the execution of the laws that are made, and remain in force. And thus the legislative and executive power come often to be separated.

145. There is another power in every commonwealth which one may call natural, because it is that which answers to the power every man naturally had before he entered into society. For though in a commonwealth the members of it are distinct persons, still, in reference to one another, and, as such, are governed by the laws of the society, yet, in reference to the rest of mankind, they make one body, which is, as every member of it before was, still in the state of Nature with the rest of mankind, so that the controversies that happen between any man of the society with those that are out of it are managed by the public, and an injury done to a member of their body engages the whole in the reparation of it. So that under this consideration the whole community is one body in the state of Nature in respect of all other states or persons out of its community.

146. This, therefore, contains the power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions with all persons and communities without the commonwealth, and may be called federative if any one pleases. So the thing be understood, I am indifferent as to the name.

147. These two powers, executive and federative, though they be really distinct in themselves, yet one comprehending the execution of the municipal laws of the society within itself upon all that are parts of it, the other the management of the security and interest of the public without with all those that it may receive benefit or damage from, yet they are always almost united. And though this federative power in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the commonwealth, yet it is much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws than the executive, and so must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those whose hands it is in, to be managed for the public good. For the laws that concern subjects one amongst another, being to direct their actions, may well enough precede them. But what is to be done in reference to foreigners depending much upon their actions, and the variation of designs and interests, must be left in great part to the prudence of those who have this power committed to them, to be managed by the best of their skill for the advantage of the commonwealth.

148. Though, as I said, the executive and federative power of every community be really distinct in themselves, yet they are hardly to be separated and placed at the same time in the hands of distinct persons. For both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise, it is almost impracticable to place the force of the commonwealth in distinct and not subordinate hands, or that the executive and federative power should be placed in persons that might act separately, whereby the force of the public would be under different commands, which would be apt some time or other to cause disorder and ruin.

一 文獻(xiàn)出處

John Locke,Second Treatise of Government, Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub. Co., 1980, pp.42-77.

二 文獻(xiàn)導(dǎo)讀

《政府論》是英國(guó)政治思想家洛克的代表作。洛克是現(xiàn)代民主政府理論的奠基者，是現(xiàn)代形式政府理論的第一人。《政府論》是政府理論第一論，洛克之后的政府理論基本上都圍繞著洛克的《政府論》展開(kāi)。

《政府論》上、下篇是洛克傾注多年心血的經(jīng)典之作，是他對(duì)多年政治經(jīng)驗(yàn)的理性思考和總結(jié)。上篇撰于1681年，作者逐條批駁了保皇派思想家R．菲爾默宣揚(yáng)的“君權(quán)神授”和“王位世襲”說(shuō)。下篇撰于1689年，在批判君權(quán)神授的基礎(chǔ)上，系統(tǒng)地提出了資產(chǎn)階級(jí)的政治理論。在這部著作中，作者對(duì)近半個(gè)世紀(jì)英國(guó)政治思想領(lǐng)域的斗爭(zhēng)進(jìn)行了清理和總結(jié)，為新政權(quán)提供了理論論證。他在書(shū)中提出的自由、法治與分權(quán)的政治原則發(fā)揚(yáng)了西方近代自由與憲政的傳統(tǒng)，對(duì)美法革命時(shí)期的政治思想和西方政治制度產(chǎn)生深遠(yuǎn)的影響，《政府論》一書(shū)也因此被資產(chǎn)階級(jí)奉為“圣經(jīng)”。

17世紀(jì)是英國(guó)社會(huì)在政治和法學(xué)史上具有根本意義的革命所發(fā)生的時(shí)代。該世紀(jì)初，斯圖亞特王朝統(tǒng)治開(kāi)始，國(guó)王與議會(huì)在主權(quán)淵源和性質(zhì)以及法治問(wèn)題上互不相容，發(fā)生沖突且日益升級(jí)，并最終以國(guó)王被送上斷頭臺(tái)而告終。隨后革命的清教徒統(tǒng)治英國(guó)一直到1660年，此后卻再也不能繼續(xù)按照他們的方式進(jìn)行下去。查理二世復(fù)辟導(dǎo)致有關(guān)爭(zhēng)端一直未解決，而且繼位的詹姆士二世的固執(zhí)與對(duì)新教臣民的冷漠，尤其是讓自己的官員中充斥天王教徒的做法，導(dǎo)致了輝格黨人和托利黨人聯(lián)合起來(lái)廢黜了詹姆士二世，由新教徒奧蘭治的威廉和妻子瑪麗聯(lián)合執(zhí)政。1688年的這一“光榮革命”催生了有關(guān)法律至上、人民的基本權(quán)利和政治權(quán)威的民主基礎(chǔ)等一系列原則。這些也是革命后執(zhí)政的輝格黨人形成的自己的政治傳統(tǒng)，也由此形成了英國(guó)自由主義傳統(tǒng)的核心。

這種自由主義的精神在洛克身上得到了充分的體現(xiàn)。洛克經(jīng)歷了英國(guó)革命的全過(guò)程，他曾因?yàn)檎我蛩靥拥胶商m并在那里親眼看到了荷蘭人的自由精神和英雄氣概，以及宗教和政治上自由主義的實(shí)際運(yùn)作和好處。因此，在洛克的作品中我們可以看到他對(duì)這種自由精神的向往和歌詠。

他在書(shū)中說(shuō)，生命、自由、財(cái)產(chǎn)是自然法為人類(lèi)規(guī)定的基本權(quán)利，是不可讓與、不可剝奪的，從這種觀點(diǎn)出發(fā)，洛克認(rèn)為政府的重大的和主要的目的，就是保護(hù)人們的財(cái)產(chǎn)。他強(qiáng)調(diào)，最高權(quán)力“未經(jīng)本人同意，不能取去任何人財(cái)產(chǎn)的任何部分”，即使是征收為了維持政府活動(dòng)人們必須繳納的賦稅，也必須得到人民的同意。為實(shí)現(xiàn)這一目的，政府必須實(shí)行法治和分權(quán)。因?yàn)樗麖挠?guó)的政治實(shí)踐中認(rèn)識(shí)到，對(duì)人民生命、自由、財(cái)產(chǎn)權(quán)利的真正威脅來(lái)自政府的侵害。

當(dāng)時(shí)洛克認(rèn)為國(guó)家有三種權(quán)力——立法權(quán)、執(zhí)行權(quán)和對(duì)外權(quán)，三種權(quán)力互相牽制，從而避免中央集權(quán)。

洛克也是用自然法和社會(huì)契約論來(lái)解釋政府的起源、性質(zhì)和目的的。但他與霍布斯不同，他是用性善論來(lái)解釋國(guó)家起源的。他說(shuō)，在自然狀態(tài)下，人人都是自由、平等的。但這種自然法也有很多不便的地方，有些人由于利害關(guān)系而存在偏私，一些人不遵守自然法，常常用強(qiáng)力剝奪他人的自由。于是人們?yōu)榱丝朔@種欠缺，更好地保護(hù)他們的人身和財(cái)產(chǎn)安全，便訂立契約，放棄懲罰他人的權(quán)力，把這種權(quán)力交給他們中間被指定的人，按照全體社會(huì)成員或他們授權(quán)的代表一致同意的規(guī)定來(lái)行使，這樣國(guó)家就產(chǎn)生了。還與霍布斯不同的是，這種契約不是無(wú)條件的，相反，契約訂有相互義務(wù)，要求必須履行。人務(wù)必要通情達(dá)理；只有合乎情理的人才能成為政治上的自由人。自由不是一種隨心所欲的無(wú)政府狀態(tài)，自由是無(wú)須他人強(qiáng)迫的行動(dòng)。只有合乎情理、具有責(zé)任感的人才能享有真正的自由；但是，根據(jù)洛克的看法，成年人可以經(jīng)過(guò)教育而變成合乎情理、具有責(zé)任感的人。因此，他們能夠自由，而且應(yīng)該自由。契約對(duì)政府也訂有某些條件和義務(wù)。即使政府也不能毀棄契約和威脅天賦人權(quán)——這本是政府保護(hù)的唯一宗旨。

洛克是西方最有影響的思想家之一。他和霍布斯、盧梭被公認(rèn)為社會(huì)契約論的代表人物，是最早系統(tǒng)論述天賦人權(quán)理論的思想家，是自由主義思想的創(chuàng)始人。他關(guān)于人的天賦自由權(quán)利、自由是任意處置自己的財(cái)產(chǎn)、政府的建立基于人民同意、政府權(quán)力是有限的、政府必須實(shí)行法治與分權(quán)等觀點(diǎn)，奠定了17和18世紀(jì)自由主義的基本原則，對(duì)法國(guó)啟蒙運(yùn)動(dòng)和19世紀(jì)自由主義的發(fā)展有著重要的影響。具體來(lái)看，美國(guó)《獨(dú)立宣言》和美國(guó)《憲法》的擬稿人都精通洛克的著作。《獨(dú)立宣言》上有些此詞句就是仿效洛克本人的語(yǔ)言。洛克的自由主義被美國(guó)奉為神圣，成為民族理想。他的思想深深影響了托馬斯·杰斐遜等美國(guó)政治家，并且在美洲引發(fā)了一場(chǎng)轟轟烈烈的革命浪潮。洛克的影響在法國(guó)則更為激烈。伏爾泰是第一個(gè)將洛克等人的思想傳到法國(guó)的人，法國(guó)后來(lái)的啟蒙運(yùn)動(dòng)乃至法國(guó)大革命都與洛克的思想不無(wú)關(guān)系。隨著時(shí)間的推移，洛克的影響在大不列顛、法國(guó)以及世界各地，都是十分巨大的。但是應(yīng)該注意的是，他的思想對(duì)所有民族或?qū)λ械貐^(qū)并非總是一視同仁的。洛克沒(méi)有把他的人類(lèi)自由思想引用到淪為奴隸的非洲人身上，原因顯然是他認(rèn)為蓄奴是私有財(cái)產(chǎn)的一種合法形式。

洛克的《政府論》為英國(guó)革命后政府新秩序的建立提供了一套較為完善的理論學(xué)說(shuō)和框架體系。

《政府論》發(fā)表于“光榮革命”之后，它在理論上為已經(jīng)上臺(tái)的資產(chǎn)階級(jí)的新制度進(jìn)行辯護(hù)，掃除異說(shuō)。它具有破壞性和建設(shè)性，即它挑戰(zhàn)了英國(guó)的傳統(tǒng)封建君主制，并對(duì)政府建設(shè)等一系列問(wèn)題進(jìn)行了系統(tǒng)、深刻的理論表述。這是當(dāng)時(shí)英國(guó)封建陰霾下的光亮。洛克在“光榮革命”中扮演著不可小覷的角色，他認(rèn)為議會(huì)廢黜詹姆士二世是正確的，他從理性、自然權(quán)利和人性高度上來(lái)論述整個(gè)事件。

洛克的《政府論》在政治思想史上第一次全面系統(tǒng)地闡述了政府理論與政府原則，規(guī)范了資產(chǎn)階級(jí)的政治道德，奠定了資產(chǎn)階級(jí)意識(shí)形態(tài)的基礎(chǔ)，設(shè)計(jì)了一套有效的政體模式和運(yùn)行機(jī)制。

三 延伸閱讀

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